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LATE MANUSCRIPTS  
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SÍNTESE – Os chamados manuscritos C, recente-
mente publicados, têm um interesse especial para a 
clarificação da constituição do mundo na medida em
que mostram como, a partir de um mundo primordi-
al ou quasi-mundo correlato à pré-intencionalidade,
se atinge o mundo plenamente intersubjetivo consti-
tuído por uma intencionalidade de interesses desde
uma práxis comunicativa. Seguindo os manuscritos,
este artigo tem um propósito quádruplo: 1) tentar
discernir diferentes caracterizações do mundo como
horizonte universal, representação-mundo, todo,
forma, idéia e fundamento; mostra-se, assim, o papel 
da temporalidade na raiz desses traços de mundani-
dade; 2) níveis de constituição do mundo são desve-
lados a fim de diferenciar um fundamento previa-
mente dado de um fundamento que se desenvolve 
através dos estágios do mundo egóico, mundo da 
casa, mundo da vida e mundo-em-si; desvela-se 
aqui um encaixamento desses horizontes um no 
outro; 3) uma análise posterior dos níveis é dada
através do questionamento retroativo na primalidade
(Urtümlichkeit) como um retrocesso que revela o
desenvolvimento de um pré-mundo a um mundo
genuíno; uma gênese permanente, antes de uma
gênese do passado, é realçada; 4) finalmente, mos-
trar-se-á como antecipações da fenomenologia pós-
husserliana nos remetem a uma abertura originária 
do mundo em sua mundanidade, um âmbito que é
anterior à manifestação de um mundo de objetos e
uma ordem de manifestação diferente daquela do 
mundo. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Fenomenologia genética.
Husserl. Manuscritos C. Mundo. Temporalidade.
ABSTRACT – The recently published 
C-manuscripts hold special interest for the 
clarification of the constitution of the world by 
showing how, starting from a primal or quasi-
world correlated with preintentionality, it advan-
ces to the full intersubjective world constituted 
by an intentionality of interests within commu-
nicative praxis. Following the manuscripts, this 
paper has a fourfold purpose. First, it attempts 
to discern different characterizations of the world 
as universal horizon, world-representation, whole,
form, idea, and ground. The role of temporality 
at the roots of these traits of worldliness is 
shown. Second, levels of constitution of the world 
are disclosed in order to differentiate a ready-
made ground from a ground that develops 
through the stages of egoical world, homeworld,
lifeworld, and world-in-itself. An encasement 
of these horizons one-in another is displayed. 
Third, a further analysis of levels is given through 
the inquiry back into primality (Urtümlichkeit) 
as a retrogression that reveals the development 
from a pre-world to a genuine world. A 
permanent genesis rather than a past genesis is 
brought out. Finally, anticipations will be shown 
of post-Husserlian phenomenological views 
regarding an originary openness of the world in 
its worldliness, a realm that is prior to the 
manifestation of a world of objects, and a 
different order of manifestation than that of the 
world. 
KEY WORDS – Genetic phenomenology. Husserl.
C-manuscripts . World. Temporality. 
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1 World-characterizations 
The C-manuscripts
1 afford valuable contributions to Husserl’s six characteriza-
tions of the world. They can be grouped into three pairs that depend on a distinc-
tive trait of the world, and are variously related to the temporal structure of hori-
zonedness. 
The first pair turns on uniqueness (Einzigkeit), and concerns the world as uni-
versal horizon and its thematization in a world-representation. The unfolding of 
horizons goes hand in hand with the disclosure of a world that is permanently 
subject to modification and nevertheless remains at the same time as a unique 
world in a nonthematic manner throughout the experience of objects. Husserl 
describes an interpenetration and togetherness of horizons, and a reference from 
preceeding horizons to subsequent horizons. If the references pertaining to outer 
horizons are followed, and an advance is made to further and further horizons, the 
world as universal horizon will be finally disclosed. This nexus of references means 
that the experience of the world can only take place as a “final accomplishment” 
(Endleistung) after a series of previous steps: “This accomplishment, brought 
about under the title world-experience–transcendental world-experience-implies in 
concealment a sequence of levels, on which the total accomplishment (Totalleis-
tung) (the one through which the world is ‘for me’) is grounded, i.e., that must 
necessarily be performed, so that this end-performance is achieved.” (4 f.) 
Thus, in the process of making the world manifest, a sequence of levels and a 
final performance can be disclosed. Calling attention to the mediation of objects 
and the sequence of levels, Husserl can claim that the world is “the universal 
object (Gegenstand) of an universally extended and extensible experience”.
2 Or, 
bringing the immediacy of a final accomplishment into focus, he can also assert 
that the world “does not exist as an entity, as an object (Objekt), […]”.
3 Both claims 
concern the world as universal horizon. Another viewpoint is that of a thematic 
apprehension by means of an objectifying identification. This amounts to the con-
struction, with the varying resources afforded by the surrounding world, of a 
world-representation (Weltvorstellung) as a primal configuration for our knowledge 
of the world. According to Husserl, the relationship between world-
representations and the world as a universal horizon is similar to the relationship 
between the profiles of an object and the object itself. As “‘manners of appear-
ance’ of the unique world,”
4 world-representations are based on the experience of 
particular objects of surrounding worlds and their horizons, although they are not 
limited in their range and scope to the more immediate conditions. In other words, 
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the lifeworld that functions as a ground renders possible alternative pathways 
leading to different world-representations according to the various interests and 
goals encompassed by it: “The world conscious in the manner in which at a time 
multiplicities within it are conscious in particular manners of consciousness; I am 
affected as conscious in a particular way by these multiplicities” (363). An exam-
ple is afforded by the development of a child’s world-representation, and Husserl 
holds that “a world-representation means here the world valid already for the child 
[...], the surrounding world in which it lives, to which it lives, values, strives, looks 
at, and in which it is, in which the others are already as objects and to which the 
other subjects of the living-in, operating-in, of the being-occupied are as subjects, 
which in the togetherness, included the child, always constitute being anew, 
always share the world anew” (74). 
The second pair of characterizations highlights the essential unity of the 
world and has to do with a totality connected by a form. Husserl refers to the 
experience of the world as a total experience, a total performance, a universal 
apperception or a universal intending. The world is conceived of as a “total hori-
zon” (241) or as “the universe of what now exists for me, of what now exists for 
us” (403). It is the universe of what comes into being by its own without any help 
from us or is brought about by us through an immediate or mediate activity. In 
order to avoid the impression that the world is limited to a marginal horizon as the 
final term of explication, which might be suggested by the characterization as 
universal horizon, this new characterization stresses the enclosure of all objects 
and horizons that have been exceeded. Thus, the world encloses not only what 
has not been objectified and cannot be objectified, but also the sum total of ob-
jects encompassed within the universal horizon. This means that the inquiry must 
follow a twofold orientation directed both to the whole and to the world-form that 
explains why the whole has a unity. Time, space, and causality are structures in 
this universal form that stamp duration, extension and causal properties on ob-
jects: “Objective time is the form of objective becoming, of objective alteration, 
that holds all individual real beings as beings in becoming (as persisting beings) in 
a totality [...]. The world-totality of an objective time-phase (of a time-point) has 
the form space, it is the form of coexistence in a time-point. The universal pres-
ence of causality: causality <is> nothing other than the lack of independence of 
each temporal extent, of each-temporal point as limit of the temporal extent, [...]” 
(408). Causality entails a stronger mode of connection than a binding through 
spatiotemporality. This strict connection is not added subsequently to what exists 
in isolation, but rather shows that plurality preceeds singularity within a relation-
ship of belonging together by which the alteration of an object is the consequence 
of alterations in other objects. Thus, contrary to spatiotemporality, causality is not 
a “form of distribution”, but rather a “connecting form” that brings forth “a univer-
sal relatedness one-to-another in action and passion.”
5 
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The third pair of characterizations turns on the harmony of world-experience, 
and depicts the world as a ground that both results from past experiences and 
sustains present modalizations, and an idea that maintains future world-
experience open. It is linked to the development and harmony of world-experience 
in time: “The actual being,” Husserl writes, “has as now-being a core of settled 
being (erledigtes Sein), of already actual being, of already actualized being, and its 
horizon of the coming-first-into-being, of the to-be-actualized or first-to-be-
actualized” (403). With respect to the future, the world-horizon shows an open 
indeterminateness. As we unfold open horizons according to the immer wieder of 
explication, we become aware of the possibility of an unendless process. The idea 
is concealed in our experience and is disclosed by a reflexive consciousness 
turned to the indefinitely repeated unfolding of the world. Reflection discovers an 
orientation toward the complete givenness of the world, and, on the basis of this 
direction to fullness, extrapolates the goal to which the process advances. As an 
infinite and unattainable pole, the idea is motivated by the harmonious fulfillment 
of all partial anticipations, and by the continuous increase in the grade of perfec-
tion toward a limit that cannot be intuitively given. Since the unravelling of inten-
tional implications is not performed in an arbitrary manner, the notion of idea 
brings out a teleological movement in world-experience, which was only implicit 
in the characterizations as universal horizon and totality. Husserl speaks of the 
constitution “of a harmonious world, constantly adjusting itself, enriching itself, 
always predelineated as an idea, [...]” (373), and stresses the implications of the 
intersubjective character of this constitution: “The transcendence in which the 
world is constituted, consists in that it constitutes itself by means of the others 
and the generatively constituted co-subjectivity and because of that obtains its 
being-sense as an infinite world” (393). 
As concerns our present world-experience, the world-horizon becomes a 
ground (Boden) in two senses. First, it is a ground in the sense of a nonobjective 
margin out of which objects can be made distinct and clarified. Second, the world-
horizon sustains modalization because it renders possible the maintenance of the 
locus occupied by an object after the cancellation of its validity so that it may be 
filled up again with a new object. So, after the cancellation of an objective inten-
tion, another objective intention attains validity. Furthermore, the world is a 
ground not only in its present connection to any type of object, but also by its 
association with the past experience of particular types of objects. Along with 
world-experience as a flow of intentional acts in the actual moment, there is a 
sedimented world-possession, which has been characterized by Husserl as “a 
foundation (Unterlage), a ground for new acts, new sense-formations” (372). The 
world is now pregiven with a degree of familiarity that also contributes to the 
harmony of world-experience by organizing it according to play-spaces (Spiel-
räume), i.e., a typicality that encloses all particular types. In contrast to this famil-
iar ground that emerges as a precipitate of experience, the underlying-marginal 
ground can be seen as a primal ground (Urboden).   145
We see, then, that the world can be characterized as a horizon out of which 
manifold representations emerge by virtue of an openness to new possibilities that 
the present brings forth, as an all-encompassing unity on account of a form whose 
basic structure is temporality, as an idea because of an anticipation outlined for 
the future, as a primal ground owing to a abiding structure of the present, and as 
an acquired ground due to a possession that the past affords. 
2 World-levels 
Husserl refers to different levels in the constitution of the world in these terms: 
“Insofar as it appears that temporalization and time, and hence also existing objec-
tivity, the existing world, have different levels, with regard to which, in each case in 
a particular sense of being as being-temporal, we can speak of a universe of being 
as ‘world,’ and of time itself, one must say: times, objects, worlds of every sense 
have finally their origin in the primal world of the living present, or, better in the 
transcendental primal-ego (Ur-Ego) that lives his primal life as primally flowing pres-
entation and present, and so in its manner has being, being in its primal temporali-
zation, which in the flow constitutes a primal time and <a> primal world (Urwelt)” 
(4). There are three key points to note in this passage. First, Husserl states that there 
are levels in the constitution of the world. Second, he holds that these levels also 
entail a different manifestation of objects and time. Third, he asserts that this articu-
lation leads back to a primal world. Leaving the last point for the next section, I will 
first focus on the levels of constitution of the world according to the different types 
of phenomenological analysis. 
A “regressive destratification” (regressive Abschichtung) and a “progressive 
bringing-into-play” (progressives Ins-Spiel-Setzen) (87) reveal a sequence of five 
levels that can be considered not only according to the dimensions of worldliness, 
temporality, and objectivity mentioned in the quoted passage, but also with regard 
to the dimensions of subjectivity, acts, and temporality. 
In a first level of static analysis, the world can be depicted according to the 
three aforementioned pairs of characterizations, if we leave out of consideration the 
flowing character of the world as ground, i.e., we focus on it as the primal marginal-
underlying basis or as a ready-made outcome. To this it must be added that the flow 
of time is envisaged as an impressional consciousness with its retentional and pro-
tentional horizons, acts as interpretations of an inert primary sensibility, intersubjec-
tivity as tied to an experience grounded on the actual presence of the other’s body, 
objectivity as ready-made items taken as guiding clues for intentional analysis, and 
subjectivity as a pole for the irradiation of acts: “But all this (and such is the sense of 
this ‘static’ <phenomenology>),” writes Husserl, “before any question about a gene-
sis, about a history of the becoming of the world in transcendental subjectivity and 
its here still unknown for us transcendental temporality” (5). The peculiarity of the 
other four levels is that successive steps in the becoming or development of the 
world are taken into consideration. Hence an analysis of world-levels is basically an 
analysis of the world as a pre-given ground.   146
A second level is that of genetic analysis. Husserl goes on to raise the “ques-
tion about a genesis, about a history of the becoming of the world in the tran-
scendental subjectivity and its here still unknown for us transcendental temporal-
ity” (5). Worldliness appers now as typicality encompassing manifold types. 
Habitualities on the noetic side, and, correlatively, empirical types on the noe-
matic side, establish a system of intentions and orientations towards the world 
that make up as a whole the world that exists for each ego. From now on our 
theme is what Husserl calls “the world-possession of a horizonedness, whose 
mobility and sense is the great problem” (254). In turn, temporality is character-
ized by a determinate protentional orientation. This means that protentions are not 
merely opened to the future but also allow a predelineation of future experience 
because they are second-order intentions that reflect first-order retentions. Due to 
their motivation in genetic syntheses, protentions are anticipating intentions that 
depend on the style of previous experiences. Parallel to these modes of worldliness 
and temporality, objects are considered as substrates of typical determinations, 
acts as conditioned not only by affections but also by a secondary sensibility, i.e., 
by what the ego has acquired and maintains as an abinding possession, intersub-
jectivity as reduced to types according to habitual modes of behavior, and sub-
jects as substrates of habitualities. 
With regard to habitualities, Husserl refers to an instinctive intentionality that 
is previous to the acquisition of habitualities and amounts to an originary habitual-
ity: “The instinctive intentionality of the monads belongs to their worldly being 
and life, their satisfaction is directed to the world” (169). Husserl speaks of stages 
of development both in th sense that out of a single-celled being an animal monad 
emerges, and out of the animal monad a human monad emerges, and in the sense 
that there is a succession of ages that encompasses embryonic stages, childhood, 
adolescence, maturity, and old age: “And here we have the bio-psychically ten-
dentious (das biophysisch Tendenziöse) in the typical becoming, the natural-
historical style” (170). This process is reflected in the correlative constitution of the 
world: “The world itself has a childhood and grows up to a mature world, [...]” 
(74). Husserl speaks of a twofold habituality. On the one hand, there are habituali-
ties directed to what already exists because they have been acquired and have 
become  “settled interests” ( erledigte Interessen) that amount to a permanente 
possession. On the other hand, there are the habitualities of the ends that guide 
our action, i.e., “genuine interests, those of the enduring plans, of the ends and 
systems of ends, vital ends, and of the particular possessions referred to them as 
means that are available and stand at the ready with the preferential awakenings, 
and of the living systems of ends, of the plans that guide personality” (75). Husserl 
states that the two sides of habituality are reflected in the articulation of horizons 
in a passage that highlights the distinction between the world as ground and 
universal horizon: “The concept of horizon splits up also. Horizon of the situation, 
a vital interest is stirred up, on which the momentary activities are supported, 
stirred up in another way is the whole world-horizon, insofar as the world is al-
ways there” (75).   147
With the nonegological genetic analysis a radical transformation takes place 
through the enlargement of egological transcendental subjectivity into intersubjec-
tivity: “Naturally the world does not compose itself piece by piece out of the pri-
mordially reduced worlds. Every primordial sphere is the product of a reduction 
from an intersubjective and generatively constituted sense, the sense of being 
arises from the intersubjectively concordant experience of each one out of an ex-
perience that already has a sense-relation to intersubjectivity. My experience as 
experience of the world (and so each of my perceptions) includes not only others 
as world-objects, but also constantly (in co-validity with regard to being) as co-
subjects, as co-constitutive, and both aspects are inseparably intertwined” (HM 
VIII, 394). The retrospective inquiry starting from the world-phenomenon leads 
now back to a transcendental intersubjectivity that is examined in the three levels 
of primal history, historicity as the full-fledged process of institution and reactiva-
tion of sense, and second historicity as the development of a rational community. 
Husserl states that “of course, world-constitution is not the affair of this single 
growing human being, but of the intersubjectivity of growing and already grown 
human beings, [...]” (75), and hence points to the “transcendental co-bearers (Mit-
träger) of the world-phenomenon” (347) and “the building-up of the full world” 
(336). 
In the level of primal history, the world appears as a homeworld built on the 
earth as what supports as from below all human activity. On this basis, Husserl 
can refer to a “surrounding world as homeworld” and to a “synthesis of home-
worlds” (409). The surrounding world can be depicted as a more or less compre-
hensive environment, but it is always referred back to a home as the domain of 
family-life and the originary sphere of acting and enduring. This new view of the 
world leads to a complementation of the previous analyses of time both with a 
pre-egoical time grounded on instincts and a familial or generative time that 
emerges by virtue of a primary process of communalization. As regards the other 
dimensions of phenomenological analysis, acts follow the ends raised in the 
homeworld, objects are those typical to this limited environment, and subjects are 
homecomrades. Husserl stresses a generative nexus that is previous to historical 
traditions: “The finite ego in the concatention of its generation, the infinity of 
generations. The primal tradition of procreation, the procreators transmitting their 
individual being in the procreated individual, tradition in the communalization of 
awaken individuals. What is proper to me, makes an impression on others. Over-
lapping of individuals, associative products of blending in the individuals and 
bearing-one-in-the-other (Ineinandertragen) of the proper and the alien. So in the 
pretraditional tradition. Bequeathal of the originary generative tradition and be-
queathal of the customary tradition, historically” (437). 
If we now turn to the level of history and its traditions, we see that the world is 
a “communicative surrounding world as the field of a communicative praxis” for a 
“communicative humanity” (398, 400). This new environment has as a distinctive 
character a typical acquaintedness with the world character valid for subjects that 
are the bearers of lasting and widespread ends: “If a human being has already a   148
horizon of humanity in historical development, and, expressed more clearly, already 
a world-consciousness through a history that discovers the development, then […] 
the world-horizon receives a new predelineation of sense” (242). The world has the 
character of a historical and communitarian ground, which Husserl, although only 
very occasionally in the C-manuscripts, calls the lifeworld, and within it the temporal 
horizons of manifold subjects overlap with one another and bring forth the unity of 
historical time. As regards the other dimensions, intersubjectivity develops into a 
higher-order generativity overarching a wide spatio-temporal extent, acts become 
the reactivation of the communitarian acquisitions, subjectivity turns into the bearer 
of this bequeathed validity, and objects expand into cultural objects. 
Finally, philosophy and science understand worldliness in the mode of the true 
world in itself in contrast to the various surrounding worlds. These environments, 
with their world-representations, appear as more or less unilateral apprehensions of 
the actual world conceived of as an idea to which we approximate. This means that 
a theoretical interest attempts to establish what the world really is in the midst of 
changing circumstances by disclosing identical characteristics that are not tied to 
them: “The real being (das wirkliche Sein) is an a priori norm, an idea, to which I 
approximate actively and freely, which I can occasionally miss, but with the apodic-
tic certainty, that after all it exists as a limit, that it has its empty, to be produced 
actively and freely, harmonious and always more complete and approximating man-
ners of givenness” (91). The temporal counterpart is the notion of intemporal forma-
tions that can be repeated in an identical manner, and provide the basis for the 
production of further higher-level formations, in a process that can be reiterated over 
and over again so that it becomes directed to infinite poles. Corresponding to these 
modes of temporality and worldliness, intersubjectivity shows itself as a rational 
community made up by subjects whose acts, by virtue of intending ideal and imper-
ishable acts, appear within a horizon of infinite tasks as the “universal horizon of the 
possible developments of mature humanity–we rational human beings, we scientific 
human beings” (243). As Husserl writes in the following passage, we have the ca-
pacity to develop teleologically, but this is not inevitable: “Phenomenology can dis-
close a universal, absolute teleology, to which the necessary awakening of the teleo-
logical idea of human being in its conscious reference to a realm of absolute teleo-
logical harmony (realm of ends) <belongs>. But the absolute teleology is not a char-
acteristic of the pregiven world as such, it is never something ‘already existent,’ it is 
not a necessary structural form, predelineated and admitting to be set apart in the 
already existent worldliness, as the form of an inductive future” (433 f.). Husserl goes 
on to observe that, therefore, one must differentiate the harmony of developments 
due to primal instincts in the sphere of primal passivity, to acquired habitualities, 
and to the invariable structures of transcendental subjectivity, and what he defines 
as “the development structure of the ‘higher’ humanity, the ‘tendency’ to the devel-
opment (Ausbildung) of the norm-idea guiding the proper authentic ego, the idea of 
intersubjective authenticity, the correlative norm-idea of a beautiful world (die korre-
lative Normidee einer schönen Welt), in which one lives in freedom under the idea of 
freedom, co-responsible, co-shaping” (434).   149
The stratification goes hand to hand with an an encasement of levels, to 
which Husserl refers in the following terms: “To the present as a living and flow-
ing happening pertains an endless horizon, and a horizon that itself flows, and 
modifies its content in the flow, the future process of a continuity of processes, 
which are reiteratively encased one-in-another, [...]. If one considers the prede-
lineated total horizon, the totally and reiteratively encased continuity, it is to be 
considered in itself as the unity of a process that modifies itself reiteratively and 
has its reiterated total horizon before itself as on the other hand after itself” (405). 
The encasement is characterized explicitly in temporal terms in the sense that a 
past present encloses within itself a further past, and so forth, but it is also ana-
lyzed by implication as an encasement of levels of horizonedness in which every 
partial level is encompassed by a wider level without losing its distinctive traits, 
although it does not remain unaffected by the intermingling of the more determi-
nate strata. Along with the encasement within dimensions, there is also an over-
lapping or interpenetration of the dimensions as one moves forward through the 
levels in the direction of more determinateness. 
The egoical world, the homeworld, the socio-historical world, and the world-
in-itself do not exclude each other, but rather coexist in an encasement one-
within-the other that does not make them indistinct. Husserl explicitly makes the 
point that the foundation-sequence by which we advance from the conditions of 
possibility of social integration, through life in society, to a rational community, 
does not entail a separate development: “For every deconstruction-reduction (Ab-
bau-Reduktion) is valid the main principle that the deconstruction strata are not 
constituted in the genesis separately (für sich) in a genetic sequence that corre-
sponds to the foundation-sequence. Of course, to each stratum there corresponds 
a stratum in the genesis; all the intentionality through which a pregiven world is 
constituted, is genetically acquired and is conceived in a genetical continual be-
coming. But all geneses of all strata operate together in the immanence of time 
(fungieren immanent zeitlich zusammen), they are coexisting geneses” (394). 
3  A Depth Analysis of Levels: the Primal World 
So far the levels of world-constitution have been considered according to in-
creasing degrees of complexity brought about by the dimension of intersubjectiv-
ity. Husserl also advances a depth egological analysis in order to understand “the 
worldly concept of experience and the worldly concept of consciousness,” which 
is a consciousness of, as “that of a constitutive result” (335 n.). With this purpose 
he outlines a “system of tasks” (350) in which the process that leads to the world 
as a constitutive outcome is examined in a series of levels that emerge out of a 
life-stream (Lebensstrom) or stream of lived-experiences (Erlebnisstrom). The con-
stitution of the world is disclosed through a deconstruction that advances toward 
a primal hyle (Ur-Hyle) as a “core alien to the ego” (ichfremder Kern) in the living 
present (110). The world-apperception and the sequence of levels leading to it are 
bracketed in order attain a nonapperceptive sphere in the sense that it is nothing   150
more than a hyletic core that functions as a material for the presentative function 
of consciousness. Each life-stream has an ego-pole (Ich-Pol) as a pole of unity that 
goes through it. This means that an identical ego with its rays of affection and 
action is a constant stratum in the life-stream, whereas the hyle makes up the 
opposite “side of what is other than the ego’s own” (Seite des Ichfremden). Thus 
the life-stream is two-sided: “Every lived-experience, and now in a more concrete 
manner a two-sided one, has an ego-side and a nonegoic-side, which is alien to 
the ego (ichfremde), or each unity has a double stratum, a stratum of the stimulus 
(Reiz) or of the guidepoint (‘form’) and that of the what (was) of this form, of the 
unity, that exercizes the stimulus there or is the that toward-which (Woraufhin) of 
the directedness” (189). On the basis of this life-stream and its two sides we must 
show the order of the constitutive building-up of the world. But both sides are still 
indistinguishable in content, for all their difference in function. As Husserl puts it: 
“The constitution of beings of different levels, of worlds, of times, has two primal 
presuppositions, two primal sources (Urquellen) that [...] always ‘underlie’ it: 1) mi 
primal ego as operating, as primal ego in its affections and actions, with all its 
essential formations in accompanying modes, 2) my primal nonego, as a primal 
stream of temporalization and itself as a primal form of temporalization, constitut-
ing a time-field, that of primal materiality (Ur-Sachlichkeit). But both primal 
grounds (Urgründe) are united, inseparable and so abstract when considered by 
themselves” (199). 
Husserl inquires into a primal level (Urstufe) prior to any kind of apperceptive 
constitution and refers it, on the side of the ego, to a primal kinaesthesia (Urk-
inästhese) directed in an undifferentiated manner to an also undifferentiated primal 
hyle (Urhyle) that fills the whole life-stream. Kinaesthesia are egoical events that 
Husserl characterizes both as nonvoluntary events and as passive events of will 
because will can hold sway over them (see 336). When he describes them as non-
voluntary events, Husserl refers to “the instinct that has its effect on the kinaes-
thesia” (328), and speaks of an “instinctive drive of objectivation – nature” (331), 
which leads eventually to the constitution of a “unique world” (einzige Welt), of 
which nature is the “primal core” (Urkern) (336). There is a “guidance of primal 
instincts” in the “primal constitutive building-up of the world in its being-regions” 
(318). Husserl considers this primal kinaesthesia in the pre-ego in terms of an 
interpenetration (Durcheinander) of different partial types of kinaesthesia, and 
stresses that the relationship between kinaesthetical pre-egoical directedness and 
undifferentiated hyle continuously changes. So we have “a uniform, aimless ‘do-
ing’ at one with an nonseparated totality of the hyle (mit einer ungeschiedenen 
Totalität der Hyle)” (113). The subjective side of the life-stream must be taken into 
consideration not only through kinaesthesia but also “as feeling, as mood, as a 
universal horizonal ‘life-feeling’ (‘Lebensgefühl’)” (362), which will condition the 
way in which the ego has to do with what is alien to it. This is the level of a pas-
sive primal intentionality that, in spite of its passivity, is somehow or other di-
rected to the world: “The instinctive intentionality of monads belongs to their 
worldly being and life, their satisfaction is worldly directed” (169). Nevertheless,   151
owing to the lack of explicit intentional references, there are no objects and hori-
zonedness is fused with the undifferentiated hyle. We have “instinct with an 
empty horizon” (283). 
Differentiation of unities occurs on the basis of this undifferentiated ground. 
For Husserl, the life-stream as a time-stream amounts to a preontic being. It is 
“the first level of ontification or objectivation, of which the uppermost level is the 
natural world, […]” (198). In a second level, particular units grow out of the hyle: 
first, the particular sense-fields, and, then, the particular formations that within 
them exert a stimulus or attraction on the ego. The streaming life (das strömende 
Leben) in its twosidedness is subject to the essential set of laws of association and 
first of all to those of the primal association pertaining to passive temporalization. 
This means that differentiated hyletic data emerge through an identification in the 
hyletic primal sphere. At this primal level, a similarity-identification obtains be-
tween a primal impression and the corresponding retention.: “In the last hyletic 
primal sphere there is identification only by an intentional modification that con-
tinuously differentiates itself; it is the intentional modification of ‘retention,’ the 
continuous depresentification, we could say, which as a modification of similarity 
makes up in a flowing manner a succession of temporalization and in this succes-
sion continuously produces in a process a unifying identity” (134). Thus, the reten-
tional modification brings forth a constant identification between its content and 
that of further similar phases. The primal hyle is constituted in the flow of time 
through an association of what is similar in its adjoining phases. As Husserl writes 
in the following passage, the time-constituting flow is at the basis of hyletic differ-
entiation: “Of course, I always need two different kind of things: the flowing field 
of ‘lived-experiences,’ in which there is continuously a field of primal impression, 
which fades away in retention, and has before itself protention – on the other 
hand the ego that is affected from there and motivated to action” (118). 
Husserl also deals with “the problem of instinct as a principle of association of 
affections” (196 n.). Unities emerge as a primal mode (Urmodus) of affection out of 
associative process that are connected in an instinctive manner, and arouse par-
ticular feelings and kinaesthesia that lead to an originary turning-toward (Zu-
wendung). This is the level of the primal affection of intentional unites on the side 
of what is alien along with a primal will and a primal feeling on the side of the 
ego. These three primal moments lay out the fundamentals for the building-up of 
the world, but are not to be considered yet as moments of a “consciousness of,” 
because the intentional unities have not yet been apperceived and hence are still 
not objects. This is the level of the lowest constitution of unities in “the universe 
of pre-being” (das Universum des Vor-Seienden) (187), i.e., in “the primal tempo-
ralization in which a hyletic quasi-world, alien to the ego (eine ichfremde 
hyletische Quasi-Welt), has its pre-being (Vor-sein)” (350). As regards the other 
side of the life-stream, there is “the ego for which this pre-world (Vor-Welt) is, 
through which or through the functioning of which, in affection and action, the 
genuine world (die eigentliche Welt) comes to creation, in a plurality of levels of 
creation, to which relative worlds (relative Welten) correspond” (350).   152
The primal hyle corresponds to a pre-nature and is a previous level for the 
constitution of the meaning “nature”. It is prior to “apprehension” or “conscious-
ness of,” with regard to which it will functions as a “natural hyle.” Husserl at-
tempts to show the “sense of the separation between a primal sphere of being = 
nature (Ur-Seinssphäre = Natur) and a world of goods in the usual sense” (318 n.), 
i.e., a world that expresses human intentions and puts them into practice. As we 
have seen, an originary instinct of objectivation, which conditions kinaesthesia, 
and a motivation by feeling-affections (Gefühlaffektionen) of pleasure in contrast to 
negative feelings of aversion that can block the objectivation, are the presupposi-
tions of a “natural objectivation” or “primal objectivation (Urobjektivation) that 
yields nature” (321). It is through feeling that hyletic data, by attraction or repul-
sion, can motivate the ego to a willing or reluctance (Hin-Wollen, Wider-Wollen). 
Hence Husserl can speak of “the data of sensation, with their feeling moments, 
and also the impulse moments (Triebmomente)” (113). The primal objectivation 
must take place in a normal situation in which there is only a situation of pleasure: 
“Here the Aristotelian assertion ‘All human beings by nature have delight in ais-
thesis’ obtains its truth” (321). 
Hyletic unities have an effect on the ego because they affect and stimulate, 
and the ego answers to this stimulation with an activity directed to the unities as 
a goal, as a that-toward-which (Woraufhin) (see 83). Here begins the process of 
ontification. The outstanding data are both a stimulus and a goal. They affect the 
ego and hence are the terminus a quo for instinctive intentions. In the spere of 
vision, e.g., these intentions are motivated by visual data and are fulfilled in the 
constitution of visual things. There is an instinctive excitation of oculomotor kin-
aesthesia and other kinaesthetic systems that are grounded on other intertwined 
instinctive tendencies. The oculomotor kinaesthesia, when they are under way, 
bring forth the discharge of an optic intention, but this unloading of tension is only 
a passage way to a further stage. For the optic datum attained summons up new 
kinaesthesia that in turn lead to new optic data. This means that every optical 
datum is both a terminus ad quem and a terminus a quo. For the optic and the 
kinaesthetic processes “do not proceed one next to the other (nebeneinander), but 
rather in the unity of an intentionality, [...]” (329). Husserl characterizes the in-
stinctive drive as “the preliminary form of a preliminary possession” (die Vorform 
der Vorhabe), i.e., as an anticipation of secondary sensibility, and the satisfaction 
of the drive as “the preliminary form of the genuine act (die Vorform des ei-
gentlichen Aktes)” (326). 
Let us now turn to a twofold constitution of horizons that goes hand in hand 
with the constitution of units and is preserved in the further levels. On the one 
hand, the force of affection of the stimulus can amount to nothing. A true affection 
is the presupposition for an answer of the ego. There is a graduality in the obtru-
siveness (Aufdringlichkeit) of hyletic unities within a “horizon of affection” (240) in 
the sense of a background with a varying degree of affecting components that can 
can drown each other down in a competition, in which the relegated unities loose 
their stimulating power, fall out of the horizon of affection, and do not motivate   153
the ego to turn toward them. On the other hand, due to temporalization, the im-
pression as a primal mode of hyle turns into empty modes. Thus, horizonedness 
appears in this second level as an empty reference. 
A third level is that of constituting acts that operate in the unity of a world-
constitution. In its lowest sublevel, the first world-apperception concerns primor-
dial nature, i.e., a world in the invariant form of spatio-temporality and causality. 
Individual objects are experienced as objects within an open world-horizon. As 
regards horizonedness, beyond the theme to which the ego is directed, there is a 
first background composed by what is not observed thematically but nevertheless 
is noticeable because it still partakes of the horizon of affection. A second back-
ground is made up by the unconscious that has no affecting capacity because it 
amounts to a total nullity. A whole of null-affections and null-implications is 
blended into a nonseparated total null and makes up “a background of the ‘uncon-
scious,’ of what does not speak according to all its ‘components’ but also as a 
whole, of a night that is silent, that exercizes no call, and contains no call in itself” 
(192). Along with this outer null-horizon, there is the inner null-horizon made up 
by what is implicit in the theme. Furthermore, Husserl refers to a third type of 
background in order to account for something different from the theme that con-
cerns the ego in a secondary manner. As he puts it: “Different concepts of back-
ground: 1) the absolutely unconscious, the absolute zero; 2) the ‘unobserved,’ 
although ‘noticeable,’ affecting, not getting through with its voice; 3) that with 
which the ego has to do, not primarly, but rather ‘still’ has to do” (184). 
Husserl analyzes as a fourth level that of the experiencing acts conceived of 
as particular apperceptions enclosed within a universal world-apperception. This 
means that objects are here experienced within the world as a ground or basis. 
We know objects by virtue of constituting acts, and this knowledge gives rise to 
an acquaintedness that can be actualized in experiencing acts. Concerning this, 
Husserl has the following to say: “Higher-level objects have a) a stratum that is 
based on the affecting stimulus-field and the affective performances of the lowest 
level determined by it, and b) a stratum of the field of affection, that of the higher-
level affections, and, accordingly, they have a double constitutive building-up out 
of constituting acts as against the acts of experiencing actualization of the lower-
level apperceptions, in which the ‘finished’ objectivity is experienced and ‘in-
tended’ in empty modes of experience. Experience of a thing and thing-meaning 
(Dingmeinung) is not constitutive with regard to the thing; it is [...] a fore-meaning 
(Vormeinung) that fulfills itself in the cognizance-talking, an intention directed to 
the thing” (336). In this passage several points are made. First, lower-level affec-
tions are those of a primary sensibility that stands in connection with the fields of 
sensation. Second, lower-level apperceptions are those in which sense-giving is 
carried out for the first time. Third, higher-level affections are a new name for 
what Husserl also calls secondary sensibility, i.e., the affection by sedimented past 
acts, which are now called constituting acts. They compose our world-possession 
in contrast to world-experience, and their correlate is the world as an acquired 
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determinate predelineation and of the new formation in a fully built horizon-style 
or ontological style” (241). Fourth, higher level-objects amount to objects that have 
been previously constituted and make up our acquaintedness with the world. 
Experience of these higher-level objects does not constitute them because it only 
entails an anticipation that requires a fulfillment. This means that transcendental 
subjectivity faces a world that is experienced appresentations as a present sur-
rounding world: “The last world-level,” Husserl writes, “is that in which the world 
has an open infinite horizon and being-sense, which has everything that has to be 
shaped in the particular case already predelineated in this horizon, in this sense-
form.” (239; see 396). 
For Husserl, the inquiry back to primality starting from the constitution of a 
differentiated world can be achieved in two ways. The retrogression can takes 
place in every present because an undifferentiated flow underlies the hyletic data 
and acts that emerge within it, and can refer back to the past history of the ego: 
“With regard to primality (Urtümlichkeit), it is natural to distinguish the primality 
of myself, of who inquires back starting from the constituted world, of myself the 
mature ego that meditates on myself, and the primality emerging out of the further 
retrospective inquiry, the primality of the ‘beginning’ of the constitutive genesis, 
primality reconstructed through the uncovering of the genesis” (279). Thus, 
Husserl distinguishes, on the one hand, the radical and permanent origin, of 
which the mature ego becomes aware when he becomes conscious of himself, 
and, on the other, the temporal beginnings of the constitutive genesis. Both types 
of analysis deepen the abovementioned genetic analysis in the second level with 
the disclosure of depth strata in the genesis of transcendental subjectivity. 
The first type of inquiry into primality shows that the sensuous contents to 
which the ego turns in order to grasp them cannot be an ultimate component 
because they are the outcome of associative and temporal syntheses that occur in 
the primal flow of the living present. From what is shaped or differentiated in 
these syntheses one must distinguish the differentiating or shaping stream, which, 
because it is not subject to this shaping, is an absolute and undifferentiated origin. 
On the one side there is the content that is constituted, and on the other the con-
stitutive flow that is beyond the constituted because it sets up the framework 
within which differentiations appear. So the inquiry into primality turns toward 
“my living-streaming present in its full concreteness as the primal ground and the 
primal source (Urboden und Urquell) of all validities of being that are actual for me 
in the present.”
6 The analysis concerns the ego as “‘supra-temporal’”, i.e., as “the 
ego that always is now and remains now” (202). Hence it does not have the sense 
of a regression to a moment of the past “because it is a matter, so to say,” as 
Husserl holds, “of eternal structures, which I must find, whenever I am a wakeful 
ego.”
7 Husserl adds: “I <am> in my primality a constantly streaming ‘passivity’ of 
an absolutely invariable structure; [...]” (279). These structures, to be found in the 
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lowest constitutional stratum of transcendental subjectivity, encompass a univer-
sal form, which is time as the framework for particular unities or wholes, and the 
universal principle of genesis, which is association insofar as it concerns content 
and brings forth these particular unities. By virtue of them a “genetic beginning” 
is constructed for a “living genesis” (lebendige Genesis) through an “abstractive 
inspection” (352) that rises above the constituted world. 
The other type of retrospective inquiry gets back to a primal initial horizon as 
an underlying basis for the subsequent constitution of the world. Hence Husserl 
brings out the different strata according to which the world-consciousness has 
been structured in the correlative development of the world and the ego. Starting 
from the primal horizon (Urhorizont) outlined by an inherited make-up (Erbmasse) 
that depends on instincts, the analysis goes on to show how a child “grows into 
the world, [...] into the historical status of the self-developing intersubjectivity” 
(431).
8 This second method reveals a past origin for what also has a permanent 
source in the living present. It considers a sedimentation that is the outcome of a 
temporalization that has taken place in the living presente. In other words, it re-
veals a historical genesis besides the living genesis. Passages as the following 
raise the difficult question of how to interpret the profound connection between 
both types of retrospective inquiry: “In the genetic retrospective inquiry we con-
struct as a beginning the-still deprived of world–preliminary field and pre-ego (das 
noch weltlose Vorfeld und Vor-ich), which is already a centre, but not yet a ‘per-
son,’ let alone a person in the usual sense of a human person” (352). 
4 Post-Husserlian  Phenomenology 
Husserl’s key insight is to see that the world can be depicted according to 
various characterizations and levels, that it has a fluent status, and that it can be 
deconstructed into a pre-world or primal world so that a ready-made world is 
nothing but a first step in phenomenological research. This makes way toward 
post-Husserlian standpoints, and three points can be made in this regard at the 
close of our study. 
First, there is Heidegger’s view, in Being and Time, that emphasizes an origi-
nary openness of the world in its worldliness. After expounding the reference 
context that constitutes worldliness as significance, Heidegger gives a further step 
when he states that anxiety as a mode of attunement is not about an innerworldly 
being. This means that the totality of reference presupposed by innerworldly be-
ings breaks down, and that “on the basis of this insignificance of what is inner-
worldly, the world is all that obtrudes itself in its worldliness.”
9 The counterpart of 
anxiety and its annihilation of innerworldly beings is to be found, not in the phe-
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nomenological reduction as has been claimed,
10 but rather in the vanishing of 
intentions within the reduced world. We must recall that Husserl differentiates a 
thematic or nonthematic patent world and a latent world that encompasses a 
horizon of acquaintedness and a horizon of nonacquaintedness. Acquaintedness is 
made up by habitualities and interests that outline the sphere of significance. It 
amounts to a complex of objectifying intentions (Vorstellungen) stemming from 
the familiar ground. The important point is that latency allows for degrees of dis-
tinctness that fade out into a sphere of nonacquaintedness, i.e., an empty horizon 
in which nothing is intended. This means that Husserl pushes the inquiry into the 
world to the point where, beyond horizons of empty objectifying intentions, there 
is only an undifferentiated horizon. He claims that “everything in the mode of 
horizonedness (alles Horizonthafte) is the facultative possibility of passing over to 
new experiences, from which new predelineations follow, with new paths for 
actual verifying perception, and beyond there is always an empty horizon without 
determinate predelineation, but always with the sense of possible paths of experi-
ence with the corresponding, unacquainted, undetermined predelineations” (263).
11 
Insignificance, in the sense of the loss of relevance of innerworldly beings, 
appears for Husserl where objectifying intentions disappear. This occurs not only 
in the world as the marginal horizon next to the clarifies patent world and the 
differentiated latent world, but also in the world as the underlying basis for modal-
izations. In both cases the world appears as the other of an object. This means 
that the world-horizon must be referred back exclusively to transcendental life that 
sustains it. Yet this does not mean that that it must be referred genetically to the 
subjective history in which the ground of sense and validity has been constituted 
because it falls outside acquaintedness and its previous givenness of significance. 
Hence the distinction between a constant and a familiar changing ground. By way 
of the vanishing of objectifying intentions both in a marginal horizon, which is the 
ground of potentially differentiated intentional objectifications, and in an underly-
ing horizon, which is the ground for the replacement of one by another, Husserl 
comes to a situation in which, to take up Heidegger’s words, “the world is all that 
obtrudes itself in its worldliness.”
12 
A second post-Husserlian view highlights a realm that is prior to the manifes-
tation of the world as the universal horizon of objects. It is well known that Mau-
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rice Merleau-Ponty explicitly interprets Husserl’s Vor-Sein as “the most primordial 
Being” or “the brute and Savage Being against the sedimented-ontic being.”
13 He 
describes nature as a layer of the primordial Being that entails a capacity of action 
that we can use even if it is not our own, i.e., an originary productivity that never 
ceases to support all worldly productions. This also means that nature “does not 
want to let itself be enclosed in a preformed mould,” and is to be found under all 
cultural and historical developments as the “roots” or the “matrixes” of history in 
the manner of “our primal history of fleshly beings co-present to a unique world.”
14 
Similarly, as has been mentioned, Husserl refers in the C-manuscripts to a natural 
core of the world: “‘Nature’ is a core, matter (hyle) of the world as experienced – a 
core that accepts ‘spiritualization’ and already has it beforehand in world-
consciousness” (111). Merleau-Ponty believes that this immemorial nature entails 
that we are faced with a primal history in the sense that human action reassumes 
in a “different architectonic” the elements afforded by a “logos of the natural 
world.”
15 The bearer of meaning is always present in a thinglike manner, and we 
always have the possibility of detachment and distantiation from the expressed 
sense. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, I can always treat cultural objects as patterns of 
form and color devoid of human meaning.
16 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a “between” out of which subject and 
object emerge is clearly anticipated in the first level disclosed by the inquiry back 
into primality, i.e., the life-stream. In spite of its two-sidedness, the stream re-
mains undifferentiated both in what concerns the contents of each side and with 
regard to the sides themselves because the primal hyle and the primal kinaesthe-
sia are so inextricably intertwined that, as Husserl holds, they are “abstract when 
considered by themselves.” So we can see that primal kinaesthesia makes up a 
yet inarticulated realm of possibilities out of which an articulated order of move-
ments can constitute itself. 
 Finally, there is the view of a different order of manifestation than that of the 
world. Husserl’s notion of a “primal feeling” (Urgefühl) tied to the “primal affection 
of nonobjects” (335) also anticipates Michel Henry’s contrast between the cogni-
zance of life through self-affection within the radical immanence of affectivity and 
the knowledge of consciousness through an intentional relationship with the ex-
ternal world. This author advocates the thesis that at the basis of all intentional 
reference to the world, and all worldly developments, there are nonworldly affec-
tive tonalities that enable life to intend the world and display its productive force. 
Thus, the disclosure of the world has its condition of possibility in a self-disclosure 
or original self-manifestation or self-affection in which there is no intending or 
referring, i.e., no distance between what appears, the appearing, and that to whi-
ch it appears Henry claims that a radical reduction must go beyond the transcen-
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dental reduction in order to set aside “this zone of light that we call the world in 
order to discover that without which this horizon of visibilization would never 
become visible, namely, the self-affection of its transcendental exteriority in the 
pathos with no outside of Life.”
17 This antecedence of feeling with regard to inten-
tional activity, in a level in which the ego is not separated from itself, is also pre-
sent in the following passage of Husserl: “The ‘adressing’ of content is not a call 
to something, but rather a feeling being-there of the ego (ein fühlendes Dabei-Sein 
des Ich), and certainly not first a being-there through getting there and reaching. 
The ego is not something for itself (für sich), and neither is the alien to the ego 
(das Ichfremde) something separated from the ego, and between both there is no 
space for a turning toward. Rather the ego and what is alien are inseparable; the 
ego is a feeling ego in each content in the content complex and in the whole 
complex. Feeling is the set of states (Zuständlichkeit) of the ego before any activ-
ity, and, when active, in the activity” (351 f.). Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
Husserl keeps referring to the alien even in this undifferentated level because the 
twosidedness of the life-stream is always stressed. He never cuts off self-affection 
from hetero-affection. Consequently, a pure self-affection would have to be con-
sidered as a second-stage contraction in which it becomes unravelled from out-
wardness, so that, even if not manifested in the world, it at least presupposes the 
world. Husserl does refer to “the constant structure hyle and hyle in feeling-
characters,” but immediately adds: “We distinguish unity of hyle and unity of 
feeling. Each has its different manner of modification, […]” (352). 
At the end of this closing reference to worldly obtrusiveness regardless of be-
ings, pre-worldly Being, and nonworldly manifestation, we may recall that, when 
he refers to the problems that have to do with pauses in intersubjective constitu-
tion as issues that can be examined by means of an archeological discovery, Hus-
serl makes in passing the following remark: “They make up the metaworldly-
transcendental questions that transcend the whole level of the transcendental 
interpretation of the world” (23). This very incidental reference to a metamundane 
and metatranscendental sphere provides motives to pursue the analysis in the 
direction of new levels in the margins of those that have been described. And the 
view that pre-given worlds must be surpassed in order to reveal their sources or 
conditions of possibility is central in post-Husserlian phenomenology. 
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